




Agri-environmental Regulation on the Back of a 












st Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society 
Reading UK, April 2























                                                 
1 Corresponding Author:  School of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Western Australia, 35 
Stirling Hwy, Crawley WA 6009 Australia.  e-mail:  bwhite@are.uwa.edu.au 
 
2 School of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Western Australia 
3 University of Maryland and University of Western Australia 
The Authors acknowledge the support of a Land and Water Australia Grant   2
 
 





A land retirement policy whereby land is taken out of agriculture and converted to natural 
vegetation or  forestry has the potential to  reduce  environmental damage related to dryland 
salinity in Western Australia.  This paper uses some recent results in the theory of directional 
distance functions (Chambers and Fare, 2004) to analyse alternative policy designs for a land 
retirement scheme.  The results indicate that a fixed price scheme is inefficient compared with 
a first-best solution, but performs adequately.  A scheme requiring a fixed proportion of area 
retired by all producers is inefficient.  A separating solution, based on mechanism design, gives 
a small but siginificant increase in welfare compared to a fixed price scheme. 
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1. Introduction  
Land  retirement  policies,  such  as  the  EU  set-aside  scheme  and  CRP  in  the  US,  where  a 
regulator  aims  to  retire  a  proportion  of  the  agricultural  land  in  a  region  to  achieve 
environmental  objectives  are  increasingly  important  policy  instruments.    Environmental 
objectives  and/or  damage  in  Australia  due  to  agriculture  can  be  partially  addressed  by  a 
scheme of land retirement.  The issue addressed here is how should a land retirement scheme 
be designed when there is an asymmetry of information between the regulator and farmers.  
Chambers,  (1987,  2002b)  addresses  the  general  problem  of  asymmetric  information  in 
agricultural policy using mechanism design. Mechanism design has also been proposed as an   3
approach to agri-environmental policy (Wu and Babcock, 1996; Moxey, et al., 1998; Bontems, 
et al., 2005) and land retirement policy (Smith, 1995; Bourgeon et al., 1995). 
 
Despite  a  large  number  of  theoretical  models  based on  mechanism  design  the  number  of 
empirical applications has been small. Realistic applications are to be found in Smith (1995) 
who analyses a land retirement scheme by regions in the US; Bourgeon et al. (1995) apply 
mechanism design to the EU Set-aside scheme; and Bontems et al. (2005) design an optimal 
non-linear production tax/subsidy to address non-point source pollution. The reason for lack of 
applications is that they must resolve difficult empirical issues related to defining compliance 
cost functions and how they vary across farms when the farm population are heterogeneous.  
Firm  type  in  most  theoretical  models  is  a  single  parameter  which  measures  technical 
efficiency.  In practice a number of other unobservable variables determine compliance cost 
including endowments of fixed factors of production, and allocative efficiency. The theoretical 
models developed in this paper are applied for a sample of farms in the Greater Southern 
region of Western Australia for the crop year 1999. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents a theoretical model of 
the regulator’s problem.  Section 3 presents the approach to empirical modelling. Section 4 
presents results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Regulation Model 
A regulator, who acts as a Stackelberg leader (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, p56) sets up a scheme to 
retire  land  to  maximise  welfare.  Farm  profit,  for  allocatively  efficient  farms,  is  given  by  the 
restricted profit function  ( , , , , )
h h h p w a x p q where p and w are vectors of output and input prices, 
h a is  hectares farmed subject to fixed  inputs other than  land 
h x . Farm type is represented by 
technical efficiency 
h q  , land area and endowment of fixed resources.  The reservation profit is   4
0 0 0 ( , , , , )
h h h h p w a x p p q = where  0
h a  is the initial land area. The environmental benefit associated 
with crop land retirement is captured by 0 v > .  
 
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993, p56), the welfare function is: 
  0 0 0
,  
{ ( ( , , , , ))  }
h h
h h h h h h h h h
b h
Maximize v a p w a x b a
a
a p p q l a - - - ￿     (1) 
 
where welfare is maximised with respect to the transfer payment per hectare
h b  and the proportion 
of  land  retired   
h a .    The  welfare  function  comprise  three  components:  the  first  gives  the 
environmental benefit of land retirement, the second gives the compliance cost as the difference 
between the reservation profit and profit with land retirement and the third gives taxpayer cost as 
the transfer payment per hectare weighted by the shadow price of public funds, l.  This welfare 
function simplifies to: 
0
,
{ ( , , , , ) }
h h
h h h h h h
b h
Maximize p w a x b a
a
p q l a - ￿          (2) 
by assuming the scheme retires a fixed total area and noting that the reservation profit is constant 
and can be dropped from the welfare  function. 
For first-best (Policy 1a), by assuming that firms are allocatively efficient, (2) is maximised subject 
to an individual rationality constraint  
0 0 ( , , , , )         
h h h h h h h p w a x b a h p p q a £ + "           (3) 
and a land retirement constraint: 
  0 0
h h h
h h
a a a t = ￿ ￿ .                (4) 
where the sum of land retired ( 0
h h h r a a = ) by individual farms equals the target proportion t of the 
total area. Each farm is offered an individual contract which specifies the proportion of the base 
area to be retired and the transfer payment per hectare. 
   5
Policy 1b is where farms are assumed to take decisions based on a vector of farm specific ‘wrong 
prices’,  ,
h h p w   (allocatively  inefficient).    As  for  Policy  1b  each  farm  is  offered  individual 
contracts. 
 
A fixed price scheme (Policy 2) offers all farms a fixed price per hectare  b for land retired and 
allows the farms to decide on the area retired.  Policy 3 offers a fixed price and fixed area scheme 
and includes (4) and  
  0          
h h r a h t = "                 (5) 
where,  all  producers  are  constrained to  retire  a  fixed  proportion  of their  area.  This  scheme  is 
equivalent to the EU set-aside scheme. 
 
Policy 3 and 4 are pooling policies where there is no differentiation between farm types.  Policy 1 
offers  separate  contracts  to each farmer, but may  not be applicable  where farms self-select  A 
separating solution, if it is optimal, specifies a menu of contracts which require producers to retire 
different proportions of the land area in exchange for different rates of payment per ha. Policy 4 is 
an adaptation of Policy 1 and includes incentive compatibility constraints, which ensures efficient 
self selection. 
 
0 0 0 0 ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )       , ;   .
h h h h h h h k h h h k k h p w a x b a p w a x b a h k H h k p a q a p a q a + ‡ + ˛ „   (6) 
 
Thus each firm identified in the population as a ‘type’ and has a policy given by { , }
h h b a .  The left 
hand side of (6) gives the producer’s profit of selecting the contract intended for type h.  The 
right hand side gives the profit derived by type h selecting the contract intended for type k. 
   6
3. Estimating Compliance Costs 
The regulation models discussed in subsection 2 will be analysed based on directional distance 
function  approach.  Directional  output  distance  function  (Chambers,  2002)  is  estimated  to 
measure the technical and allocative efficiency of farms. The output distance function allows 
maximum expansion of the output in a specified direction and is defined as follows: firm h 
produce a vector of outputs 
m y + ￿ ˛  using a vector of inputs 
n y + ￿ ˛ .   Technology is defined as 
a set:  
: ) , {( :
m n m n x T T
+ + + + ￿ ￿ ˛ = ￿ · ￿ ￿ x can produce y} 
The technology, T, satisfies the regularity conditions of no free lunch, is closed and convex, 
and has free disposability of inputs and outputs (Chambers, 2002). The output distance function 
is defined as follows: 
{ }
, ( , ; ) max :( ) , ,(0, ) (0 0 )
m n m




The firms operating on the frontier, where the value of the output distance function is zero, 
indicates that no further output expansion in the direction is feasible. Firms operating below the 
frontier are inefficient and the output distance measures the inefficiency of these firms. 
 
The  directional  output  distance  function  is  a  complete  functional  representation  of  the 
technology in that: 
( , ; ) 0 o y D x y g ‡
r
 if and only if  T y ˛                (7) 
Where (7) implies that x can produce y if and only the distance function is nonnegative. In 
addition it is assumed that the output distance function satisfies the translation property so that:  
( , ; ) ( , ; ) ,      o y y o y D x y g g D x y g R q q q + = - ˛
r r
          (8)   7
 
3.1. The Technical and Allocative Efficiency  
Chambers and Fare (2004), establish results for the determination of technical and allocative 
efficiency using a distance function where the translation property  holds. Their approach is 
based on Nerlove (1965) and states that an allocatively efficient firm solves the following profit 
maximization problem given technical efficiency q . 
0 sup :( , , ) sup : ( , , ) 0
     ( , )
o y o y y
y




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = - £ = - + £ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= +
r r
   (9) 
which follows  from the translation property (8).   Equation (9) is  normalized form by dividing 
through by pgy to give: 
q p p + = ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ
0 w p  
For the directional vector adopted here pgy is the sum of output prices. Chambers and Fare (2004) 
define  the  difference  between  normalized  maximal  profit  and  normalized  observed  profit 
  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) p w p p -   as  Nerlovian  profit  efficiency.  Nerlovian  efficiency  can  be  decomposed  into 
allocative and technical efficiency using the approach of Lau and Yotopolous (1971) who assume 
that each firm perceive the ‘wrong’ prices p
h and w
h when taking input and output decisions. 
{ } 0 0 sup :( , , ) sup : ( , ; ) 0
( , )




p y w x D x y g p y w x D x y g g









Assuming that the profit function is differentiable we obtain: 
( , , ) ( , )
h h h h
y p y p w g p w q q p = +D  
( , ) ( , )
h h h h
w x p w p w p = -D  
by Hotelling’s Lemma.  The observed profit with allocative inefficiency is 
0 ( , , ) ( , )
ai h h h h
y pg py p w wx p w p q q = + -    8
If we normalize by pgy, add the normalised maximal profit to both sides, and rearrange to give: 
{ } 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , )
ai h h h h p w p w py p w wx p w p p p q q - = - - -  
The first term in brackets gives allocative efficiency as the difference between normalised profit 
and the profit at the outputs and inputs for the ‘wrong’ prices calculated using normalised prices. 
 
Relating the conditions for profit maximization to the distance function gives the following 
first order conditions for an interior solution  
( , ; )
h h
o y y y p D x y g p g
ﬁ
= -D             (10) 
( , ; )
h h
x o y y w D x y g p g = D
r
            (11) 
These first-order conditions are employed in the empirical regulation model analysis. 
3.2 Functional Form 
Ideally, the  functional form for the distance function must satisfy two requirements, first it 
should be flexible, and second it should satisfy the translation property (8).  This narrows the 
choice  of  tractable  output  distance  functions  to the  quadratic  form  proposed by  Chambers 
(1998): 
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( , ; )
2 2 2
n n n m m n n n
h h h h h h h h h h
o y i i ij i j kj k l k k ij i k
i i j k l i i k
D x y g x x x y y b y x y a a a b g
= = = = = = = =
= + + + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
r
                        (12) 
Following  Färe  et  al.  (2001)  and  Aigner  and  Chu  (1968)  this  study  estimates  the  output 
distance function (12) using linear programming. Where the parameters α0,, αi,, αij,  βkl, bk and γik  
are selected to minimise  




D x y g ￿
r
              (13a) 
subject to    9
0 0 ( , ; ) 0
h h
o y D x y g ‡
r
,    h "             (13b) 
0 0 ( , ; ) 0
h h
y o y D x y g D £
r
,   h "             (13c) 
0 0 ( , ; ) 0
h h
x y D x y g D ‡
r
,    h "             (13d) 
where  0
h y  and  0
h x  give the observed input and output use where land is included in the input 
vector. 
 
The output distance function inherits its properties from the output possibility set and to ensure 
functional form in (12) satisfy these properties, the minimisation problem in (13a) is solved 
subject to the following restrictions: (13b) constrains each firm to produce on or below the 
production frontier. Restrictions (13c) and (13d) ensure free disposability of inputs and outputs.  
 
The following parameter restrictions ensure the output distance function satisfies the translation 
property (Chambers, 1998): 
αij = αji and βkl = βlk.; 
1 1 1




b k m i n b g
= = =
￿ = - ￿ = = ￿ = =  
If the output set is assumed to be convex then the distance function  is concave in outputs 
(Chambers,  2002).    The  curvature  restriction  is  imposed  using  Lau’s  (1978)  Cholesky 
decomposition method to ensure the Hessian matrix H for the distance function is negative 
semi-definite.  The approach requires that the Hessian is given by  
' H LDL =   
where D  a diagonal matrix of Cholesky values and L  is a lower triangular matrix.   For the 
distance  function  (12)  weak  concavity  is  imposed  by  reparametrizing  the  parameters  and 
ensured  the  Cholesky  values  are  constrained  to  be  non-positive.    The  advantage  of  the 
quadratic functional form is that the Hessian matrix is parametric, thus global concavity can be   10
imposed on the estimated distance function (Chambers, 1989) and it has the interpretation of 
the second order Taylor series approximation. 
3.3 Empirical Regulation Model 
The profit function is not derived explicitly in this analysis; instead profit depends upon finding 
the maximum profit which is achievable given the firm’s fixed input constraints and technical 









p l a - ￿              (14a) 
subject to  
*( , ; )
h h h
o y D x y g q ‡
r
,    h "               (14b) 
*( , ; ) 0
h h
y o y D x y g D £
r
,   h "               (14c) 
*( , ; ) 0
h h
x o y D x y g D ‡
r
,   h "               (14d) 
h h h py wx p = -     h "               (14e) 
0 ( )




r a t = ￿ ￿     h "               (14g) 
0
h h a a £       h "               (14h) 
0 ( ) 0
h h h h b r p p - - ‡     h "               (14i) 
 
That is, the regulator’s objective function is maximised, subject to a series of constraints that 
derive from the estimated distance function, 
*( , ; )
h h
o y D x y g
r
 that is (14b) the firm’s efficiency is 
not  increasing,  the  solution  is  at  a  point  in  the  technology set  where  the  output does  not 
increase the distance and inputs do not reduce the distance.  Equation (14e) gives the profit 
after land retirement.  A land retirement variable 
h r  is defined by (14f).  Equation (14g) is a   11
land retirement constraint which specifies that a proportion of the original area t is retired.  
Equation (14h) ensures that the crop area is reduced.  Equation (14i) is an individual rationality 
constraint. 
 
Policy 1b can be assessed assuming allocative inefficiency, by taking the shadow prices of 
outputs 
h p and inputs 
h w measured at the firms current input and output mix and forming the 
constraints: 
*( , ; )
h h h h
y o y y D p g = D p x y g
r
 
*( , ; )
h h h h
x o y y D p g = D w x y g
r
 
For the fixed price policy, Policy 2, the profit maximisation problem is identical except that the 
individual farm transfers 
h b are replaced by a fixed transfer payment  b per hectare, farms are 
allowed to select the area of their farm retired. 
 
Policy 3 requires a fixed price and a fixed proportion of the farm area to be retired.  This 
problem is the same as Policy 2 except that the land retirement constraint (14g) is replaced by: 
  0          
h h r a h t = "  
Policy  4  requires  that  producers  self-select from  a  menu of contracts  which  are  give  as  a 
transfer payment per hectare 
h b and as a proportion of the area retired 
h a is the same as Policy 
1 except for the addition of the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint 
  0 0       , ;   .
hh h h h hk k k h b a b a h k H h k p a p a + ‡ + ˛ „  
All variable input and output vectors for firms are modified to give 
hk x and 
hk y , that is the input 
and  output  level  when  the  firm  selects  ‘wrong  contracts’.  Note  that  this  leads  to 
2 ( ) H H - additional  constraints  for the  IC constraint  and the  profit  constraints.   The  complete 









p l a - ￿              (15a) 
subject to  
*( , ; )        ,
hk hk h
o y D x y g h k H q ‡ ˛
r
              (15b) 
*( , ; ) 0        ,
hk hk
y o y D x y g h k H D £ ˛
r
              (15c) 
*( , ; ) 0        ,
hk hk
x o y D x y g h k H D ‡ ˛
r
              (15d) 
hk hk hk py wx p = -                   (15e) 
0




r a t = ￿ ￿                   (15g) 
0
h h a a £                     (15h) 
0 0 ( ) 0
h hh h h h b a p p a - - ‡                 (15i) 
0 0       , ;   .
hh h h h hk k k h b a b a h k H h k p a p a + ‡ + ˛ „           (15j) 
 
4. Data 
The data were derived from farm accounts and physical records for a sample of farms in the 
Great Southern region of Western Australia for 1999.  Descriptive statistics for the 61 farms for 
the 1999 crop year are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.  Outputs are given as two aggregate 
revenue measures: one for crop output and the other for livestock output.  Defining outputs as 
revenues assumes that prices are constant across farms.  This is a reasonable assumption for 
crops  which are largely sold to a single cooperative (CBH).  Similarly,  livestock output is 
dominated by wool and lamb for the export market and tends to pass through a small number of 
regional markets.  The inputs machinery, services and crop input are given as total costs under 
these headings.  Land is given as hectares, labour as full-time equivalent weeks and stock head   13
as the equivalent of the number of breeding ewes on the basis of forage requirements.  Further 
definitions and units are given in Table A2. 
5. Results  
5.1 Estimation 
The  estimation  of  the  distance  function  was  carried  out  using  LP  algorithm  (GAMS 
Corporation, 1996). Table A3 presents the parameter estimates of the output distance function. 
Parameters are estimated using the curvature restriction that the distance function is concave in 
output. Technical, allocative and profit efficiency measures are given in Table A4. Notably 
firms  appear  to  be  relatively  technically  efficient,  but  have  a  low  degree  of  allocative 
efficiency. 
 
Table 1 about here 
5.2 Policy Comparison 
The  welfare  functions  and  transfer  payment  per  hectares  values  are  compared  for  the 
different policies in Table 1.  In the case of Policy 1 (first-best) and Policy 4 (asymmetric 
information) the transfer payments are given as a range indicating how they vary amongst 
those farms participating in the scheme.  A number of conclusions can be derived from the 
results.    First  fixed  area  schemes  Policy  3  are  clearly  inferior  to  other  policies.  This, 
undifferentiated contract is administratively easy but due to the higher transfer payment will 
lead to some farmers being overcompensated. Policy 2 (fixed price) performs well and is 
only slightly inferior  to the first-best and asymmetric information policy.  The first-best 
policy with allocative inefficiency (Policy 1b) stands out as giving some unusual results:  
the welfare value is reduced because firms respond to the policy on the basis of the wrong 
prices, as the transfer payments are based on a comparison with maximal profit rather than   14
actual profit these are inflated, finally, with the wrong prices area restrictions can actually 
increase profit by fortuitously increasing a firms allocative efficiency. 
6. Conclusion  
This paper proposes a non-parametric approach to policy design applied to a land retirement 
scheme.  The analysis makes use of some recent results by Chambers and Fare (2004) on the 
decomposition of profit efficiency into allocative and technical efficiency.  It highlights the 
issue in mechanism design of determining what is meant by firm type.  Here it is defined as 
technical and allocative efficiency, plus the endowment of fixed factors. 
 
The  results  indicate  that  a  fixed  price  scheme  is  relatively  efficient  compared  with  a 
hypothetical first-best solution.  Forcing all farmers to retire a fixed proportion of their area 
significantly reduces the efficiency of a land retirement policy.  A separating solution based on 
mechanism design gives a small but significant increase in welfare. 
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Table 1 Comparison of Policy Options on Contract Design 
 













































$ per ha 
5  94.0  12.00-16.78  28.6  7.058-26.130  93.0  16.78  90.5  24.87    93.8  6.01-10.23 
10  91.5  21.25-36.49  28.6  6.558-85.045  89.5  36.49  86.7  44.83  89.6  21.25- 71.43 
15  88.9  21.25-39.01  28.4  6.090 -26.130 86.9  39.01  84.0  48.10  88.3  21.25- 345.09 
20  86.1  21.25-39.33  28.6  3.829-85.049  84.5  39.33  80.3  67.27  85.8  21.25- 816.34 
25  83.4  21.25-39.62  28.7  5.429-93.718  81.9  39.62  76.3  92.91  83.3  21.25- 251.08 
   17
Appendix  
 
Table A1 Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable   Description  Unit 
Crop revenue  Crop revenue in calendar year  $ 
Livestock revenue  Revenue from wool, lamb and cattle sales  $ 
land  Cleared land area  ha 
labour  Family and hired labour  weeks 
machinery  Total value of machinery   $ 
Livestock   Stock numbers adjusted to ewe equivalents  Head ewes 
crop inputs  Fertiliser, seed and sprays  $ 
services  Includes  overheads  postage,  phone,  subscriptions, 
accounting and consultancy costs 
$ 
rain  Farm rain during cropping season 1999  mm 
 
 
Table A2 Descriptive Statistics for Farm Data 1999 (N=61) 
Subscript    Units  Average  SD  max  min 
1  crop revenue  $  437002  312698  1573255  7373 
2  livestock revenue  $  42252  47291  265015  0 
1  Land   Ha  2095  1245  7644  520 
2  Machinery   $  444597  421879  2625000  34250 
3  livestock  hd (ewes)  2449  2184  15655  0 
4  labour  weeks  96  43  283  48 
5  crop inputs  $  155597  115166  583147  17006 
6  rain  mm  442  90  682  279 
7  service  $  128887  70687  431247  42388   18
 
Table A3 - Parameter Estimates 
Parameter   
α0  -0.078 
α1  0.002 
α2  0.287 
α3  0.004 
α4  0.757 
α5  0.063 
α6  0.012 
b1  -0.219 
b2  -0.781 
α11  -1.000E-6 
α12  -0.001 
α13  -2.846E-6 
α14  -1.672E-8 
α15  1.394 
α16  2.572E-6 
α21  -0.001 
α22  -1.814E-5 
α23  -6.506E-4 
α24  2.1997E-4 
α25  0.002 
α26  2.9947E-4 
α31  -2.846E-6 
α32  -6.506E-4 
α33  -2.291E-5 
α34  -0.004 
α35  -0.01 
α36  -2.543E-4 
α41  -1.672E-8 
α42  2.199 
α43  -0.004 
α44  -0.003 
α45  -0.030 
α46  -0.004 
α51  1.3942E-4 
α52  0.002 
α53  -0.001 
α54  -0.030 
α55  -0.019 
α56  0.073 
α61  2.5725E-6 
α62  2.9947E-4 
α63  -2.543E-4 
α64  -0.004 
α65  0.073 
α66  -4.479E-5 
β11  0 
β12  0 
β21  0 
β22  0 
γ12  -9.398E-5 
γ11  0.002 
γ22  -0.006 
γ21  -0.023 
γ31  0.001 
γ32  0.004 
γ41  0.008 
γ42  0.020 
γ51  -0.001 
γ52  0.009 
γ61  -0.002 
γ62  -0.013 
Outputs: Crop =1, livestock =2; Inputs: Land = 1, Machinery = 2, Livestock = 3, Labour = 4, Crop inputs 5, Rain = 6, Services = 6   19
Table A4 Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
Firm No  0 p   ( , )
s s p w p   ( , ) p w p   ( , ;1)
h h
o D x y
r
  NE  AE 
1  2.556  5.827  15.689  0.200  6.5665  4.931 
2  0.814  2.149  11.914  0.205  5.55  4.8825 
3  4.534  8.182  19.011  0.110  7.2385  5.4145 
4  2.260  5.211  13.3  0.105  5.52  4.0445 
5  2.399  4.088  15.63  0  6.6155  5.771 
6  1.941  5.247  14.72  0  6.3895  4.7365 
7  0.469  3.393  12.714  0.254  6.1225  4.6605 
8  5.118  11.189  21.045  0  7.9635  4.928 
9  0.687  2.406  10.95  0  5.1315  4.272 
10  5.800  13.835  16.586  0  5.393  1.3755 
11  1.120  2.946  12.928  0.108  5.904  4.991 
12  1.013  3.029  10.333  0.037  4.66  3.652 
13  0.469  2.162  14.132  0.030  6.8315  5.985 
14  2.077  4.523  15.798  0.164  6.8605  5.6375 
15  0.820  3.877  14.277  0.756  6.7285  5.2 
16  1.928  5.575  14.485  0.362  6.2785  4.455 
17  3.185  6.632  13.102  0.213  4.9585  3.235 
18  0.961  3.017  11.02  0.179  5.0295  4.0015 
19  1.370  3.272  12.918  0.144  5.774  4.823 
20  0.362  3.945  9.759  0.209  4.6985  2.907 
21  5.256  8.509  15.457  0  5.1005  3.474 
22  9.080  17.876  24.69  0  7.805  3.407 
23  5.142  9.587  20.407  0.017  7.6325  5.41 
24  1.511  3.106  10.332  0  4.4105  3.613 
25  0.371  1.95  9.684  0.084  4.6565  3.867 
26  0.748  6.414  18.824  0.280  9.038  6.205 
27  0.609  2.173  12.217  0.157  5.804  5.022 
28  1.237  3.728  12.562  0.118  5.6625  4.417 
29  0.975  3.58  9.501  0.329  4.263  2.9605 
30  0.612  3.651  11.201  0.128  5.2945  3.775 
31  1.645  3.091  13.332  0.034  5.8435  5.1205 
32  5.998  11.798  22.305  0.121  8.1535  5.2535 
33  1.995  5.181  12.632  0.121  5.3185  3.7255 
34  0.673  4.014  15.849  0.289  7.588  5.9175 
35  0.892  3.693  11.526  0.193  5.317  3.9165 
36  1.771  3.816  10.578  0.654  4.4035  3.381 
37  2.442  6.098  12.869  0.192  5.2135  3.3855 
38  2.060  5.672  13.128  0.247  5.534  3.728 
39  3.917  8.877  24.291  0.098  10.187  7.707 
40  1.944  4.642  12.641  0.219  5.3485  3.9995 
41  1.836  7.427  19.229  0.317  8.6965  5.901 
42  1.603  5.325  19.407  0.385  8.902  7.041 
43  1.616  3.493  12.852  0.036  5.618  4.6795 
44  7.613  11.617  21.107  0  6.747  4.745 
45  3.257  8.199  19.652  0.886  8.1975  5.7265 
46  1.724  5.736  14.15  0.357  6.213  4.207 
47  1.182  5  15.302  0.696  7.06  5.151 
48  0.690  2.498  12.963  0.550  6.1365  5.2325 
49  5.026  9.74  20.621  0  7.7975  5.4405 
50  2.287  5.7  17.196  0  7.4545  5.748 
51  2.874  6.352  17.963  0.152  7.5445  5.8055 
52  3.705  5.918  14.377  0.210  5.336  4.2295 
53  2.765  5.072  14.831  0.133  6.033  4.8795 
54  5.369  9.521  23.228  0  8.9295  6.8535 
55  2.669  6.473  17.236  0.175  7.2835  5.3815 
56  1.431  3.558  14.128  0.184  6.3485  5.285 
57  2.348  5.235  17.999  0.084  7.8255  6.382 
58  2.589  9.948  26.317  0.430  11.864  8.1845 
59  -0.503  1.548  9.529  0.369  5.016  3.9905 
60  3.111  8.908  27.238  0.278  12.0635  9.165 
61  1.538  3.287  15.932  0.442  7.197  6.3225 
 
 